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What the Sage Has Seen

09 Jun

This essay is part of the Ruminating series on Indian thought, literature, and the textures of civilisational inheritance.

There is a particular kind of devotion that has nothing to do with the divine. It attaches itself, instead, to the proximity of the divine – to the teacher, the guru, the ascetic whose reputation for austerity has calcified into a kind of authority. The object of devotion is no longer the teaching. It is the teacher’s aura. The bhakt worships not the truth glimpsed through the window but the window itself – the frame, the dust on the glass, the specific quality of light the guru’s body throws.

The Mahabharata, which knew human beings better than it is usually given credit for, diagnosed this confusion with unsentimental precision. It did so by populating its world with sages of tremendous power and embarrassing temper.

The Problem with Tapas

The traditional defence of the rishi is that he has earned his authority through tapas – austerity, penance, the long discipline of fasting, solitude, and self-denial. Years of standing on one leg. Decades in the forest. The accumulated spiritual energy of such practice is real, the tradition insists; it generates something. What it does not automatically generate is wisdom.

This is the distinction the epics keep insisting on, and which the devotional imagination keeps collapsing.

Tapas generates power. The sages of the Mahabharata are genuinely formidable. When Kindama curses King Pandu – who has accidentally killed him while hunting, in the act of love – the curse holds. When Shringi curses King Parikshit to die from snakebite within seven days because the king insulted his father, the king dies. These are not empty threats. The sages have something real. But what they have is closer to accumulated charge than to enlightenment – nuclear codes, as the document I have been thinking with puts it, given to someone with poor emotional regulation.

Durvasa is the tradition’s most notorious example: a sage who curses people for the slightest perceived insult, who makes the Mahabharata’s already turbulent narrative more turbulent still through sheer irascibility. He is not a minor figure easily dismissed. He is revered. He is sought out. Yudhishthira receives him as a guest with elaborate hospitality, in fear of what a slight might precipitate. The power is acknowledged even as the temperament is barely contained.

But the most philosophically interesting case is Mandavya.

The Sage Who Argued with Dharma

As a child, Mandavya had watched some thieves hide in his hermitage. Interrogated by the king’s soldiers, he maintained the silence of meditation and did not answer their questions. He was therefore impaled along with the thieves – collective punishment for apparent complicity. He survived the impalement. He was eventually pardoned. He was, by any measure, the victim of a catastrophic judicial error.

What Mandavya does next is not grieve or forgive. He seeks out Dharma himself – the god of righteousness, of cosmic order – and demands to know what childhood sin could possibly have warranted such a fate. Dharma replies that as a boy, Mandavya had pierced insects with a straw. The punishment, Dharma explains, was proportionate to the act.

Mandavya disagrees. A child below the age of twelve, he argues, cannot be held to the full weight of karmic consequence. The punishment was not proportionate. It was unjust. And because Dharma, the very principle of cosmic justice, permitted this injustice, Dharma must be punished in turn.

He curses Dharma to be born as a human being – a low-born human being – and that is how the Mahabharata accounts for the birth of Vidura.

The episode is extraordinary for what it admits. It admits that even the cosmic principle of righteousness can be wrong. It admits that a human being, properly equipped with moral reasoning and righteous anger, can hold the absolute to account. It admits that the tradition’s own structures of authority and justice are not self-validating. Mandavya wins the argument. Dharma accepts the curse.

But notice what this vindication costs: it requires a sage of tremendous tapas, a specific grievance so severe it overcomes reverence, and the singular audacity to curse a god. The tradition makes room for this challenge precisely once, in extraordinary circumstances, as a narrative device that explains a lineage. It does not generalise into a posture. The structure of deference remains.

Power Without Mastery

What the irascible sages collectively reveal is a gap the tradition rarely named directly but embedded everywhere in its stories: the gap between spiritual power and emotional maturity. The Bhagavad Gita has a name for the figure who has actually closed this gap. The sthita-prajna – the one of steady wisdom – is described in terms that are less about austerity than about equanimity: free from desire, fear, and anger; unmoved by sorrow and not elated by happiness; without attachment, without aversion.

That description sounds almost Buddhist. It does not describe Durvasa. It does not describe most of the tradition’s celebrated sages. It describes, perhaps, Vidura – who understood dharma and came close to living it. And it describes Krishna, who almost never curses anyone. Krishna persuades. Krishna strategises. Krishna teaches. And, most importantly, he keeps his temper even when the entire world around him is losing theirs.

The Mahabharata’s deepest insight about wisdom may be encoded precisely in its elevation of Krishna above the ascetics. Krishna performs no visible tapas in the epic. He does not fast for years or stand on one leg. What he has is not accumulated charge but something rarer: the perception of a larger cosmic order that makes individual ego-assertion irrelevant. He transcends dharma not by violating it but by seeing past the frame that makes rule-following necessary. The sages, for all their power, are still inside the frame. They have mastered self-denial. They have not mastered self-regulation.

There is also – the tradition is honest enough to admit this – a category problem in calling these figures sages at all.

The Narrowing Circle

Not every brahmin was a sage. Not every sage was wise. Not every wise person was enlightened.

The progression itself is the insight. Brahmin originally referred to social function: learning, ritual responsibility, a life oriented toward knowledge. It was never a guarantee of virtue. Wisdom required discernment, humility, ethical maturity – not merely knowledge or spiritual power. And enlightenment represented something rarer still, which the traditions kept circling: the dissolution of the separate self, freedom from craving and aversion, abiding equanimity.

These are not the same rung. They are not even on the same ladder.

The Mahabharata consistently distinguishes between those who know dharma, those who teach it, those who attempt to practise it, and those who actually embody it. Bhishma knew dharma and remained bound by his vows. Drona knew dharma and succumbed to partiality. Vidura understood it and came closest to living it. These are not failures of intelligence. They are failures of integration – the teaching has not fully transformed the character of the teacher.

And here the text issues what may be its most uncomfortable warning: the teacher who has glimpsed the summit has something real to offer. What he offers is the glimpse. He does not offer himself.

Teachers do not hand down themselves. They hand down what they have seen.

The disciple’s task – and this is where the essay’s human interest finally surfaces – is to receive what was seen without confusing it with the one who saw it.

The Aura and Its Distortions

This is where the ancient problem becomes a contemporary one.

The bhakt of today operates on the same cognitive architecture as the supplicant who approaches Durvasa with trembling hospitality. The aura of power – whether it derives from tapas, from political charisma, from intellectual celebrity, from the sheer confidence of someone who speaks with authority – generates a devotional response that is largely involuntary. We are wired for it. The concentrated presence of someone who appears to have gone further, endured more, and seen deeper than we have produces something in us that bypasses critical evaluation. We do not examine the teaching. We absorb the teacher.

The contemporary bhakt economy runs on this absorption. The guru’s anger is reinterpreted as righteous fire. His partiality is rendered as divine selectivity. His capacity for curse is proof of power rather than evidence of unresolved ego. Every human failing becomes occluded by the accumulated charge of the aura, and anyone who attempts to separate the teaching from the teacher is accused of insufficient devotion – which is to say, insufficient surrender to the aura itself.

The Mahabharata, with its strange honesty, refuses this closure. Vyasa – compiler of the text, himself a figure of enormous spiritual authority – presents sages who become angry, make questionable choices, show favouritism, curse impulsively. The text does not apologise for them. It does not explain them away. It seems to whisper, almost against itself: do not worship human beings. Learn from them.

Later tradition elevated many of these figures into saints more completely than the epics themselves did. The Mahabharata’s realism was softened by centuries of devotion that the text itself did not invite. This is not coincidental. The aura effect is persistent. It requires constant maintenance from the outside – a community of believers who need the teacher to be more than he was, because the alternative is too uncomfortable to sit with.

The alternative is this: that one may teach truths one has not fully embodied. That insight and integration are not the same achievement. That proximity to wisdom is not wisdom, and that the person sitting at the teacher’s feet must do the work of separation – not cynical rejection, not blind acceptance, but the daily, difficult labour of discernment.

What the Disciple Must Do

The Buddha, that most disciplined of teachers, gave his students a specific instruction on exactly this problem: examine my words as you would test gold – by burning, cutting, and rubbing it. Accept them not merely out of reverence.

That is a teacher undermining the aura effect from within the teaching relationship itself. It is a remarkable thing to do.

The Indian tradition offers the same wisdom in multiple registers. The Gita offers it through the sthita-prajna – measure the teacher against the ideal of the one who actually embodies equanimity, not merely the one who speaks of it. The Upanishads offer it through the emphasis on shruti – what is heard – rather than the one who speaks. The Mahabharata offers it through accumulated narrative evidence: here are your sages, magnificent and irascible; here is what their power looks like when ego remains unresolved; now go and think carefully about what you are inheriting.

Information changes the mind. Wisdom changes conduct. Enlightenment changes being.

The truly enlightened figures across traditions are rare and memorable because they did not merely speak differently. They were different. Conduct was continuous with character. The teaching was not separate from the one who taught it because the teacher had, to the extent humanly possible, disappeared into the teaching.

Most teachers have not done this. Most teachers are Durvasa before they are Krishna: formidable, often illuminating, genuinely in possession of something worth receiving – and still, unambiguously, themselves.

The disciple who understands this is not disillusioned. He is, at last, correctly positioned to learn. He can receive what the sage has seen without mistaking it for the sage’s sanction. He can honour the teacher without abdicating the discernment that makes the honour meaningful.

Revere the truth, not the personalities. Even sages may glimpse the summit without having entirely climbed it.

The teaching was always about the summit. The aura was always about the seer.

Those are not the same thing. The Mahabharata knew this. The question is whether we have been paying attention.

 
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Posted by on 09/06/2026 in #Contemplation, #Culture, #Essays, Indian Epics, Indian Thoughts, Inner Life, Lessons, Modern Life, philosophy, Reflections, spirituality, Uncategorized, Writing, writing

 

What the Crown Prince Was Never Taught

09 Jun

A companion essay to “When Appetite Wears a Crown“

There is a form of teaching that does not announce itself. It does not draw conclusions, offer summaries, or tell you what to think at the end. It places a man before you in all his complexity – his courage, his blindness, his capacity for both loyalty and destruction – and then simply steps back. You are left to arrive at the lesson yourself, or not at all. The Mahabharata teaches this way. It has always taught this way. And perhaps no figure in the epic rewards this kind of patient attention more than the man at its centre: Duryodhana, Crown Prince of Hastinapura, Yuvaraja of the Kaurava faction, the architect of the greatest war the subcontinent had ever seen.

This essay is a companion to an earlier piece, When Appetite Wears a Crown, which argued that Duryodhana’s essential tragedy was the enthronement of appetite – desire promoted from servant to sovereign, mistaking itself for destiny. That argument stands. But there is a second question the epic quietly poses alongside it, one that belongs specifically to the domain of leadership: What does a man in a position of power owe those around him, and what happens when he has never been taught to ask that question?

The Mahabharata does not answer this directly. It shows us instead.

The Position He Occupied

To understand what the epic is doing with Duryodhana, it helps first to be precise about where he actually stands in the political architecture of the Kuru court.

He is not the king. Dhritarashtra holds that title, however compromised his claim, however diminished his authority. Duryodhana is Yuvaraja – heir presumptive, crown prince, the man waiting at the threshold of power.

He is not the commander-in-chief. Bhishma commands first, then Drona, then Karna, then Shalya. In each case, Duryodhana appoints; he does not lead from the field. He is the source of authority, not its expression.

He is not the supreme warrior. That honour is contested throughout the war among Bhishma, Arjuna, Karna, and Drona. Duryodhana is formidable – we will return to this – but the great martial set pieces belong consistently to others.

He is not the strategist. Krishna dominates that space entirely. Duryodhana has Shakuni, whose counsel is less strategy than manipulation, more cunning than wisdom.

What Duryodhana is, and what no one else in the epic can claim, is this: he is the indispensable cause of the war.

Without Duryodhana, Bhishma does not fight. Without Duryodhana, Drona does not fight. Without Duryodhana, Karna – that magnificent, tragic figure – never finds a reason to die. Shakuni’s schemes become irrelevant without the crown prince’s appetite to serve. The war exists because Duryodhana wills it into existence. Every alliance, every refusal, every burning of the lacquer house, every humiliation at the dice table – all of it traces back to one man’s insistence that what he wants is also what is right.

Modern leadership literature would have a word for this kind of person. It tends to call him a founder. The visionary who creates the conditions for everything that follows, who holds the entire enterprise together by the force of his conviction, whose departure or defeat would dissolve the whole structure into irrelevance. The epic, too, recognises this quality. What it goes on to examine is what happens when that quality exists without formation.

What the War Narrative Does Not Give Him

Here is the observation that opens a different kind of reading: Duryodhana receives far fewer sustained displays of battlefield heroism than several of the men who fight for him.

This is striking because it is not what we would expect. He is young, physically powerful, trained by Drona, a master of the mace – the Mahabharata itself confirms all of this. Yet in the war books, the narrative repeatedly displaces martial glory away from him. Bhishma receives the grandeur. Drona receives the brilliance. Karna receives the emotional investment. Ashwatthama receives the terrifying vengeance. Duryodhana, by contrast, spends much of the war encouraging others, grieving fallen allies, complaining about setbacks, questioning loyalties, urging troops forward.

He is the observer and the instigator, not the executor. This is not a failure of characterisation. It is a deliberate literary choice, and it carries a specific lesson.

The epic is showing us what it looks like when a leader has confused his position with his purpose. Duryodhana is perpetually at the periphery of the action he has caused. He mobilises the greatest assembly of warriors the world has seen, and then watches them fight his war for him – not because he lacks courage, but because mobilising others has become his primary mode of existing in the world. He is always at the centre of the politics and always at the edge of the consequences.

There is a kind of leadership that operates exactly this way. It mistakes the capacity to compel others for the capacity to lead them. It confuses the power to initiate with the wisdom to direct. It surrounds itself with capable people and then interprets their capability as a reflection of its own. Duryodhana has Bhishma, Drona, Karna, and Ashwatthama. By any rational account, he should be invincible. The Mahabharata is at least partly a meditation on why being surrounded by greatness is not the same as being great, and why the man who gathers extraordinary people around him still bears responsibility for what those people are asked to do.

The Scenes That Define Him

The moments that matter most in Duryodhana’s story are not battlefield exploits. The epic knows this. It gives him instead a series of scenes that are almost entirely verbal, relational, interior.

He refuses the needle’s point of land. He defends Karna before the assembled court at a moment when every other voice falls silent. He rebuffs Krishna’s final peace proposal – the moment when the god himself comes as ambassador, when the terms offered are extraordinarily generous, when every calculation of survival counsels acceptance. He hides in the lake after the war, exhausted and alone, the last man standing on the wrong side of the field. And then he emerges for his final duel, and he is astonishing.

This is the detail that the popular imagination often loses: when Duryodhana finally enters the war as its primary combatant, he is formidable beyond expectation. He withstands all five Pandavas. His mace combat with Bhima is described as evenly matched. Krishna himself grows anxious. The outcome is uncertain until the moment Bhima strikes below the waist – a blow outside the rules of honourable combat, signalled by Krishna as the only way to end it.

The implication is unambiguous. Duryodhana was not merely adequate. He was exceptional. The narrative chose not to foreground this until the end, which means his relative absence from the war’s heroic register was not a reflection of his limitations but a reflection of the role he had assigned to himself: the man who sends others forward.

And here the leadership lesson sharpens into something precise. The final duel reveals a man who could have led differently. Who had the courage, the physical capability, the sheer force of will. What he lacked was not strength. What he lacked was the formation that might have taught him to place that strength in service of something beyond his own claim.

The Admission He Made and Could Not Act Upon

There is a line attributed to Duryodhana that has the quality of an epitaph. Its precise wording varies across traditions and translations, but its substance is consistent:

I know what dharma is, but I cannot bring myself to follow it. I know what adharma is, but I cannot desist from it.

This is a confession of extraordinary self-awareness. It is also one of the most devastating descriptions of a leader’s failure that any text in any tradition has produced.

Duryodhana is not confused about the difference between right and wrong. He is not deceived. He is not acting under ignorance. He knows. And he acts anyway. The problem is not that he lacks instruction. The problem is that knowledge, in him, has failed to become formation. He has been told; he has not been changed.

This distinction matters enormously for anyone thinking seriously about what the epics teach. The Mahabharata is not naive about information. It is not suggesting that Duryodhana simply needed better advisors, more data, a clearer articulation of the ethical stakes. He had Vidura, one of the wisest men in the court, speaking plainly to him from childhood. He had Bhishma. He had his own mother’s prayers. The knowledge was never absent.

What was absent was the prior work of character – the slow, unglamorous formation of a self capable of acting on what it knows. The Mahabharata is unsparing about where this formation begins and ends. It begins in the household. It ends in the institution. Duryodhana grew up watched, indulged, and in perpetual competition with cousins whose mere existence felt like a refutation of his own. The court of Hastinapura formed him into exactly the kind of leader it then had to survive.

The Architecture of Loyalty and Its Costs

One of the qualities the epic explicitly praises in Duryodhana is his loyalty to Karna.

This matters because it complicates any simple dismissal. Duryodhana is not merely grasping and destructive. He is capable of genuine love, genuine recognition of worth in another human being, genuine willingness to defend that recognition at personal cost. His elevation of Karna – giving him a kingdom so that he can participate as an equal in the tournament, standing beside him when every voice of birth and convention condemns him – is one of the most consistent acts of decency in the epic.

And yet even this decency is entangled. Karna is loyal to Duryodhana in part because Duryodhana gave him something when the world gave him nothing. The loyalty runs both ways, but it is not free of obligation on either side. Duryodhana’s protection of Karna is real; it is also useful. The epic does not separate these cleanly. It holds them together and asks: does the goodness of an act become conditional on the purity of the motive? Or is goodness, when it appears, simply goodness, whatever else accompanies it?

This is a question about leadership as much as it is about ethics. Organisations are full of Karna-and-Duryodhana relationships: genuine affection, genuine mutual recognition, and yet also mutual dependence of a kind that makes it difficult for either party to tell the other what they actually need to hear. Duryodhana could not receive honest counsel from Karna because Karna owed him too much. Karna could not offer it because to do so would be to unravel the only belonging he had ever been given. The result was that two extraordinary men, capable between them of almost anything, ended up confirming each other in a direction that consumed them both.

The Mahabharata is precise about this. It does not blame their affection. It asks what affection is worth when it has never been tested by the harder form of love – the kind that is willing to disappoint in order to be honest.

What Heaven Refuses to Simplify

The essay that precedes this one ends with Duryodhana’s recognition of his own failure. But the Mahabharata does not end there. It has one more movement, and it is the most disorienting of all.

When Yudhishthira finally reaches heaven – after the war, after the interminable grief, after the slow death of everyone he loved, after the long ascent through cold and altitude and loss – he finds Duryodhana there. Resplendent. Honoured. Surrounded by celestial glory.

Yudhishthira is horrified. The reader is horrified. Every moral instinct recoils.

The explanation given is precise, and it is not a consolation. Duryodhana died as a Kshatriya. He faced the end without flinching. He fulfilled the dharma appropriate to his station as a warrior, and the cosmos, which does not operate according to simple moral arithmetic, rewarded him accordingly.

Yudhishthira’s disgust is not corrected. It is not resolved. It is allowed to stand. And this, I think, is the final teaching of the epic on the subject of leadership, and it is the hardest one.

The Mahabharata does not tell us that Duryodhana was secretly right, or that his cause was vindicated, or that the cosmos has a way of balancing accounts that the living cannot see. It tells us something far more uncomfortable: that a person can fail comprehensively in the moral dimensions of their leadership – can cause enormous, irreversible harm, can know better and refuse to act on that knowledge – and still participate in goods that are real. His courage was real. His loyalty was real. His willingness to die for what he believed, however wrongly he had come to believe it, was real.

The cosmos, in the Mahabharata’s accounting, does not erase these. It holds them alongside the failure. It refuses the simplification that would make either the failure or the virtue disappear.

For those who lead, this is the most demanding lesson the epic offers. It is not the lesson that virtue will be rewarded and vice punished in some final accounting that makes present choices easier. It is the lesson that you will be held to each dimension of your conduct separately, and that excellence in one dimension does not redeem failure in another. Duryodhana’s courage does not cancel his cruelty. His loyalty to Karna does not cancel his humiliation of Draupadi. His warrior’s death does not undo the war he chose not to prevent.

Heaven, in the Mahabharata, is not a simple destination. It is a kind of precision. Each thing is what it was.

The Lesson the Epic Does Not State

The great epics of India teach by accumulation and implication. They do not summarise at the end. They trust that a reader who has inhabited the narrative long enough will emerge with something that could not have been delivered as a proposition – a felt understanding of how character forms, how choices compound, how the man who could have changed everything becomes, instead, the man who changes everything in the worst possible way.

What the Mahabharata shows, through Duryodhana, is that leadership capacity and leadership formation are not the same thing. Capacity is the raw material: the intelligence, the courage, the charisma, the ability to mobilise others, the physical and psychological force that makes a person difficult to ignore. Duryodhana had all of this in abundance. What he lacked was the second thing: the slow work of becoming a self that holds its own capacity accountable, that can receive counsel without interpreting it as threat, that can distinguish between what it wants and what it is for.

This formation – the Mahabharata is unflinching about this – does not happen automatically. It requires institutions that expect it. Courts that demand it. Elders who model it. A culture of inheritance that asks the heir not merely to receive power but to be worthy of it before they receive it.

Hastinapura failed to produce this. It produced, instead, a young man of extraordinary ability who was never seriously required to examine whether that ability was oriented toward anything beyond itself.

The epic does not tell us this lesson. It places Duryodhana before us – his strengths undimmed, his failures undisguised, his end both honourable and devastating – and steps back.

The rest is what we do with what we have seen.

This essay is part of the Ruminating series on Indian thought, literature, and the textures of civilisational inheritance.

 
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Posted by on 09/06/2026 in #Contemplation, #Culture, #Essays, Indian Epics, Indian Thoughts, Inner Life, Lessons, Modern Life, philosophy, Reflections, spirituality, Uncategorized, Writing

 

Heroism, Sacrifice & Martyrdom – The Counterfeit

09 Jun

On self-pity masquerading as martyrdom, and why the distinction is not unkindness but moral clarity

There is one distinction the earlier essay on martyrdom did not make, and the omission is significant enough to warrant a return. The essay drew a careful line between martyrdom and heroism, between sacrifice and renunciation, between the act of witness and the communal memory that transforms it into meaning. But there is a shadow version of martyrdom – structurally similar, emotionally adjacent, and morally different in almost every important respect – that the taxonomy left unnamed. The word for it is self-pity. And I have known it at close enough quarters to know that the resemblance to martyrdom is not accidental. It is the point.

The Resemblance

Self-pity and martyrdom share enough surface features to be genuinely confused – not only by observers, but sometimes by the person inside the experience. Both involve suffering. Both involve endurance. Both generate narratives of sacrifice. Both seek, in their different ways, to be recognised. If you encounter someone who has spent years in difficult circumstances, who has given up things they were entitled to, who carries the weight of choices made for others rather than for themselves, it is not immediately obvious which of these two things you are looking at.

The confusion is compounded by the fact that self-pity often grows in soil that martyrdom would also recognise: genuine suffering, prolonged neglect, years of unacknowledged sacrifice in domestic or familial contexts, a kind of endurance that receives no public witness and therefore no communal sanctification. The suffering that generates self-pity is frequently real. That is what makes the category so difficult to handle without seeming cruel.

But the resemblance is, finally, superficial. And the differences – once named – are not subtle.

The Divergence

Martyrdom, as this essay has argued at length, is oriented outward. The martyr suffers in fidelity to something beyond themselves – a truth, a conviction, a community, a principle – and the suffering is legible as witness precisely because it points beyond the person bearing it. The focus, however painful the personal cost, remains on what is being testified to.

Self-pity inverts this structure. The suffering remains the subject. It does not point beyond itself to a meaning; it circles back, insistently, to the person at the centre of it. The implicit demand is not remembrance of what was stood for, but recognition of what was endured. Not: remember what this meant. But: remember what I bore for you.

That distinction – between meaning and indebtedness – is the fault line. The martyr asks to be remembered. The self-pitying person asks to be repaid. And the repayment sought is often not material but moral: a permanent position of acknowledged sacrifice, an exemption from criticism, an authority within relationships derived not from virtue or competence but from the accumulated weight of suffering. I have known people who operated with precisely this logic – whose suffering was real, whose sacrifices were often genuine, but who had built an identity around that suffering so thoroughly that relinquishing it would have meant relinquishing the only source of power available to them.

Secondary Gain

Psychologists sometimes use the term secondary gain to describe the benefits that accrue, often unconsciously, from remaining within a narrative of victimhood. The benefits are not trivial. They can include attention, emotional validation, immunity from criticism, moral authority within family structures, and a justification for resentments that might otherwise need to be examined. The suffering itself may be entirely genuine. What becomes problematic is the identity constructed around it – the way the suffering is tended, displayed, and deployed in relationships.

The phrase that crystallises the dynamic best is one I have encountered in a certain kind of domestic suffering: you are here because I suffered. It is presented as a statement of fact, sometimes of love. What it actually is, is a claim of ownership. It converts sacrifice – which is freely given – into a debt that can never be fully repaid. And debts, unlike gifts, generate obligation rather than gratitude. They bind rather than liberate. They make the recipient feel not loved but indebted, not grateful but guilty, not seen but instrumentalised.

The wallowing that this produces – and wallowing is the right word, unsentimental as it sounds – is not simply weakness. It is, in its way, a strategy. The person who remains permanently within the narrative of their own suffering retains something: moral high ground, emotional leverage, an identity that cannot be challenged without seeming heartless. Giving that up would mean returning to the ordinary, to the uninsulated position of being simply a person among people, judged by the same standards as everyone else. That is a more exposing position than it sounds. For someone who has found in suffering a form of sustained significance, ordinary life offers nothing equivalent.

Why the Confusion Matters

I’ve argued that not all suffering is martyrdom – that suffering is a fact, while martyrdom is an interpretation. This addendum sharpens this: not all suffering that resembles martyrdom is martyrdom. Some of it is injustice that deserves remedy. Some of it is endurance that deserves acknowledgement. Some of it is genuine sacrifice that deserves to be named. And some of it is self-pity that has learned to wear martyrdom’s clothing because that clothing commands a respect that self-pity, honestly labelled, does not.

Distinguishing between these is not an act of cruelty toward those who suffer. It is, in fact, the precondition for taking suffering seriously. If every expression of pain is treated as equally valid, equally ennobling, equally deserving of uncritical recognition, then the category loses its moral weight entirely. The person in genuine extremity – the whistleblower, the dissident, the one who actually paid an actual price for an actual conviction – is levelled down to the same status as the person who has cultivated grievance into a domestic art form. That is not compassion. It is a failure of discrimination.

I have found, having observed this dynamic at close range, that the scepticism it produces toward large claims about sacrifice is not cynicism. It is the natural consequence of seeing how the language of martyrdom can be used to romanticise passivity, justify the creation of emotional debts, and elevate the fact of suffering into a permanent moral credential. That scepticism is earned. And it should be distinguished carefully from indifference to genuine suffering – which is a different and worse thing entirely.

What Suffering Does and Does Not Confer

My argument, in its final movement, settled on this: martyrdom is what happens when a human being becomes a story. The addendum’s corresponding claim is quieter but no less important. Suffering deserves compassion. It does not, by itself, confer virtue. What we do with suffering – whether it turns us outward toward meaning or inward toward grievance, whether it opens us toward others or seals us inside a narrative of our own victimhood – may matter more than the suffering itself.

The martyr and the self-pitying person may inhabit identical external circumstances. The difference is in the direction of attention. The martyr’s suffering points at something. The self-pitying person’s suffering points back at themselves. One is a form of testimony. The other is a form of possession – of the self, first, and eventually of those close enough to be held within the gravitational field of an unrelenting narrative of sacrifice.

That is not a comfortable observation to make about people whose suffering may have been real and prolonged. But moral clarity is not the same as moral harshness. Naming the counterfeit does not dishonour the genuine. It protects it. An essay about martyrdom that ends without acknowledging the shadow version – the version that borrows martyrdom’s language while reversing its logic – has left the most domestically familiar form of the problem unexamined. This addendum is an attempt to remedy that.

Suffering is a fact. What we make of it is a choice. And not all choices made in its name deserve the same name.

 
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Posted by on 09/06/2026 in #Contemplation, #Culture, #Essays, Indian Epics, Indian Thoughts, Inner Life, Lessons, Modern Life, philosophy, Reflections, spirituality, Writing

 

Traditions, and Honest Discomforts – Part I of III

05 Jun

The Lamp Does Not Own the Flame

On the Body, the Rites, and What the Tradition Actually Believes

There is a question that any honest encounter with Hindu funeral practice eventually forces: if the atman is immortal and the body is impermanent, why do the rites surrounding that body require such precision? Why does it matter where the ashes go? And what happens in the large parts of the subcontinent where the Ganga does not flow?

The question appears to catch the tradition in a contradiction. It does not. What it catches the tradition doing is something far more interesting – holding two claims simultaneously that many philosophical systems would force into opposition: the claim that the body is not the ultimate reality of a person, and the claim that the body participates in cosmic order while it exists. These are not the same claim. Most modern summaries of Hindu thought collapse them into one and then wonder why the rites seem excessive for something allegedly disposable.

The first clarification is the most important. Classical Indian thought does not regard the body as meaningless. It regards it as impermanent. The distance between those two words is not semantic. A thing can be impermanent and still be worthy of care while it endures; it can be temporary without being trivial. The body, in the framework the epics and Upanishads actually inhabit, is the vehicle through which karma was accumulated, duties fulfilled, relationships formed, and spiritual practice undertaken. It is not the person. But it is the instrument through which the person moved through this particular life. That distinction carries moral weight.

A useful analogy presents itself, though it must be handled carefully. Think of a temple lamp. When the flame goes out, the lamp is no longer the light. Yet no one who understands the lamp kicks it into a ditch. The vessel retains its character as a vessel – as something that carried something sacred – even after it no longer carries it. The trouble with this analogy, as any attentive reader will notice, is that a lamp can be relit. A corpse cannot. The analogy smuggles in a continuity that death precisely severs. To push on this is not pedantry: it is to get closer to the real puzzle. If the soul has departed and the body is now genuinely uninhabited, what exactly is the rite honouring?

The Transition and Its Rituals

The orthodox ritual answer is that the relationship between the living and the departed is not severed at the moment of biological death. Many Hindu traditions hold that the deceased occupies an intermediate state – not yet fully among the ancestors, not yet reborn – during which the rituals performed by the living assist the passage. The body and its remains, on this account, retain a connection to the deceased that is not purely material. The antyeshti, the last sacrifice, is not the disposal of discarded packaging. It is the completion of a process. The body was the site of a life; the rite acknowledges that the life there conducted has consequences that are still unfolding.

If one accepts that metaphysic, the question about the rites largely answers itself. The precision matters because the process matters, and the process is not finished just because the breath has stopped. The rituals are not for the corpse. They are for the transition.

The second answer – available to those who find the metaphysical account either unconvincing or unnecessary – is social and psychological. Humans do not grieve abstractions. We grieve bodies: this face, these hands, this particular presence that occupied a chair at a table and will not occupy it again. The rituals provide a structure for the living to enact, collectively, the fact that a person who was here is no longer here. They transform a raw biological event into a social and spiritual one. They make grief legible, and they give it somewhere to go.

The sceptic might therefore argue that the rites are primarily for the survivors, not the departed. A traditional practitioner would reply that they are for both. What is interesting is that these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and the tradition generally does not force a choice between them.

The question about where the ashes go is the same question asked again, now in geographical terms. If the rites are not merely about the corpse but about a process still unfolding – a transition that the living assist and the cosmos receives – then the destination of the ashes is not a logistical detail. It is a theological one. It asks: into what does the departed finally pass? The Ganga is the tradition’s answer, and it requires the same kind of examination the rites required. Both resist the reduction to the merely physical, and both turn out, on closer inspection, to be more portable than they first appear.

The River That Can Be Everywhere

The question about the Ganga contains a small theology that most people skip past. The sacredness of the river is not primarily geographical. It is symbolic and, in a precise sense, theological. In many traditions, the Ganga is regarded as a heavenly river that descended to earth through the austerities of Bhagiratha; her waters carry a purifying quality because of their divine origin. Immersing ashes in the Ganga symbolically entrusts the deceased to a cosmic current that connects earth, heaven, and the ancestral realm.

The practical reality is that for most of Indian history, the overwhelming majority of Hindus never lived anywhere near the river. People in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Assam, and across Southeast Asia conducted their entire lives without Gangetic proximity. The tradition accommodated this not by lowering the standard but by expanding the theology. Local sacred rivers received ashes and were honoured as such. Priests sanctified local water by invoking, ritually, the presence of the Ganga itself.

This practice is worth dwelling on because it reveals something architecturally important about how the tradition thinks. The invocation used in countless Hindu rituals – calling together Ganga, Yamuna, Godavari, Saraswati, Narmada, Sindhu, and Kaveri to be present in whatever water stands before the priest – is not a workaround or a compromise. It is a theological claim: that sacred geography can be made present ritually. The physical river matters, but what matters more is the sacred reality that the river embodies. The river is a name for something that can be invoked wherever the conditions of invocation are met.

This is not a minor point. It means that what looks like a rigid, place-specific ritual requirement is in fact a portable theology. The geography is symbolic infrastructure, not a fixed address.

Where the Tradition Holds Its Contradictions

The deeper anthropological observation is this: Hinduism actually contains two voices that are frequently mistaken for one. The first says you are not the body. The second says the body participates in cosmic order. These are not the same claim, and the tradition never fully resolves the tension between them – because it does not try to.

The Vedantic philosopher seeking liberation may regard the body as ultimately unreal relative to the Self. The dharmic householder tradition simultaneously places enormous importance on bodily acts: feeding, bathing, marriage, cremation, ancestor rites, pilgrimage, purity, and pollution. Both voices exist, and they coexist within the same practitioner in the same lifetime.

A Vedantin can say, with complete sincerity: I am not the body. A son can say, with equal sincerity: this was my father’s body. Both statements are true within the framework that contains them. What many modern explanations do is simplify this into a kind of Indian Platonism – soul important, body unimportant – and then express puzzlement when the tradition does not behave accordingly.

If the body were truly only a vessel, the moment death occurred one could dispose of it like discarded packaging. Almost no civilisation, Hindu or otherwise, behaves this way. The funeral rites themselves are evidence that people do not actually experience human beings as souls trapped in containers. They experience persons as embodied beings whose bodies retain symbolic significance even after life has departed. The care given to the dead body reflects not a contradiction of the belief in the immortal soul, but a recognition that matter itself has participated in a sacred story.

The body is dust. But it is dust that carried a person. That distinction is doing a great deal of work in Hindu funeral practice, and it is a more sophisticated position than either pure materialism or pure spiritualism can accommodate.

Part II follows tomorrow

 
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Posted by on 05/06/2026 in #Contemplation, #Culture, #Essays, Indian Thoughts, Inner Life, Modern Life, philosophy, Reflections, spirituality, Uncategorized, Writing, writing

 

Traditions, and Honest Discomforts

04 Jun

A Preface

Every tradition carries two things simultaneously: a framework for understanding the world, and the wounds that the framework was built to address. The framework can be articulated. It can be taught, debated, revised, and transmitted across centuries. The wounds are harder. They do not always yield to articulation. They resist the very structures that were meant to contain them – and sometimes, at their most insistent, they put those structures on trial.

My own Indian traditions – the epics, the Upanishads, the dharmic and devotional literature that has accumulated across three millennia – are among the most sophisticated frameworks the human mind has produced for thinking about impermanence, duty, suffering, and the relationship between the individual life and the cosmic order in which it is embedded. They are also, on close reading, remarkably honest about their own limits. The Mahabharata does not end with the triumph of virtue. The Ramayana does not end with contentment. The tradition that gave the world karma also gave it Gandhari, who stood over the bodies of her hundred sons and cursed the god who could have prevented it. The tradition that insists the body is not the self also insists on the precise performance of rites for the dead. These are not contradictions to be smoothed over. They are the tradition thinking seriously about the actual conditions of human life.

This series of essays began as a conversation – a long, wandering, occasionally combative exchange with an interlocutor I have named Alaric, who functions as the part of my mind willing to push any argument one step further than comfort recommends. The questions ranged across Hindu funeral practice and what it actually implies about the body and the soul; the Mahabharata’s systematic dismantling of the conditions for comfortable admiration; desire, renunciation, and the particular cliff that appears one step beyond enough; Gandhari’s curse and what it accomplishes that Barbarik’s cosmic vision cannot; Job and the whirlwind and what it means that the man who argued with God spoke more rightly than the men who defended him; karma applied as a mirror and karma misapplied as a verdict; and the strange intuition that certain truths feel discovered rather than invented, that certain stories feel like remembrance rather than information.

Out of that conversation, three essays have been shaped and a coda added. They will appear across three consecutive days, with the coda following on the fourth. They can be read independently, but they are designed to be read in sequence: each one builds on the previous, and the coda draws the threads together – including threads from two earlier essays in this broader series, “Victory Produces Governors; Defeat Produces Teachers” and “The Jungle Has No Courthouse: On Dharma and Accountability,” which approached the same tradition from different angles.

The first essay asks what Hindu funeral practice actually believes about the body – not what a simplified summary of Vedantic philosophy would predict, but what the rites themselves imply. The second asks why the Mahabharata produces moral vertigo rather than moral instruction, and what it means to live inside a narrative architecture that removes the handrails deliberately. The third brings together Gandhari and Job, karma and protest, the collective pre-conscience and the question of whether some griefs are arguments to be answered or wounds to be acknowledged.

What holds all of it together is a single insistence: the cosmic explanation and the human wound must be kept in the same room. Neither is permitted to dissolve the other. The framework is real. The wound is also real. A tradition that can only accommodate one of them has not yet fully reckoned with the world it is trying to describe.

 
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Posted by on 04/06/2026 in #Contemplation, #Culture, #Essays, Indian Thoughts, Inner Life, Modern Life, philosophy, Reflections, spirituality, Uncategorized, Writing, writing

 

The Platform Oligopoly: What the Indian IBC Landscape Actually Looks Like Now

18 Apr

When I wrote about Eruditus last month, I was describing a structural shift that had just become visible. Seven universities, three cities, one platform. I argued then that what was being called an education story was, at its deeper level, a platform economics story. I argued that the infrastructure operator – not the university, not the regulator – was becoming the decisive actor in India’s emerging IBC landscape.

Three weeks later, Birkbeck, University of London received its Letter of Intent from India’s Ministry of Education. It is opening a campus in a Bengaluru tech park. Its operational partner is ECA – the Education Centre of Australia.

The picture is now complete enough to name.

What has arrived in India is not a collection of international branch campuses. It is a platform oligopoly.

The Cast of Operators

In the six months since NEP 2020’s foreign university provisions began to produce real campuses, a small set of commercial platform operators has quietly intermediated the majority of IBC activity. Eruditus (Daskalos), ECA (UniQuad), Navitas, GEDU, and Oxford International collectively sit between almost every foreign university and its India operations. Seven of the nine British universities currently planning India campuses are working with Eruditus alone, according to PIE News. ECA, the newest entrant, has announced Birkbeck as its proof-of-concept and stated explicitly that Bengaluru is “the first of many.”

These are not agents. They are not support services. They are, as I described in the March series, infrastructure that becomes the institution – controlling physical premises, recruitment pipelines, student services, digital learning systems, and in some cases, admissions decisions. The university provides the degree and the brand. The platform provides everything else.

This is not hypothetical. ECA’s own CEO Rupesh Singh states it plainly on his LinkedIn profile: “ECA partners and invests with universities to open campuses so that universities have access to new markets. ECA takes care of all legal processes and investment requirements to set up campus operations.” In that sentence, the university is the passenger. ECA is the vehicle.

The Oligopoly Dynamics

An oligopoly does not require explicit coordination. It requires only that a small number of actors control the access points to a market – and that the market’s participants cannot easily circumvent them.

That is precisely the structure now forming. A foreign university wishing to enter India faces an imposing set of requirements: regulatory compliance, physical premises, local entity formation, recruitment infrastructure, faculty sourcing, student visa navigation, and employability partnerships. Very few foreign universities can build that stack independently. The platforms can – and they have already built it, or are building it at scale across multiple university clients.

The result is structural lock-in, for universities and students alike. A university that enters India via an Eruditus or ECA arrangement saves years of market-entry time and tens of millions in capital expenditure. But it also concedes operational control – and, over time, the ability to exit without significant disruption. Students enrolling in a “University of X” campus may find that the institution shaping their daily experience is not the University of X at all, but the platform company that operates the building, runs the recruitment, and manages the learning system.

I called this the governance gap in March. It has not narrowed.

The New Variable: The Distress-Driven Platform

Eruditus arrived in India as an ambition-driven platform – Indian-founded, VC-backed, specifically positioned to exploit the opening NEP 2020 created. Its incentives, whatever their commercial character, were aligned with long-term India market-building.

ECA presents a different profile. It is an Australian international education services company entering its third decade in a post-boom landscape. Australia’s visa tightening and enrolment caps of 2024–25 materially contracted the traditional pipeline that sustained ECA’s core business – international students flowing to Australia. UniQuad, ECA’s India vehicle, inverts that model: bringing universities to students, in India, at scale. The motive is coherent. But it is worth naming: ECA is not in India because India is its primary opportunity. ECA is in India because Australia, for now, is less available.

A platform that enters a market out of distress rather than conviction operates on a shorter horizon. Its commitment to quality, to institutional culture, to the slow work of academic reputation-building – all of these are harder to sustain when the underlying logic is business continuity rather than market creation. This does not make ECA’s India operations illegitimate. It does make them worth watching with particular care.

The Regulatory Architecture Was Not Built for This

The UGC FHEI Regulations 2023 were designed with a specific problem in mind: preventing low-quality foreign institutions from entering India under the cover of brand recognition. The top-500 ranking threshold, the financial solvency requirements, the academic governance provisions – all of these were calibrated to screen universities.

They were not designed to screen platforms.

The regulations require the foreign HEI to maintain full academic and financial control of its IBC. They contain no equivalent requirement for transparency about the operational role of a commercial intermediary, no disclosure obligation about revenue-sharing arrangements, no audit mechanism to verify that the university’s nominal control is substantive rather than ceremonial.

This is the gap I described in March, and the Birkbeck-ECA case sharpens it. Birkbeck holds the LoI. Birkbeck’s name is on the degree. But ECA holds the campus infrastructure, the agent network of 4,000 recruiters, the digital learning systems, and the operational blueprint that will be replicated across multiple future university clients. In any reasonable analysis of actual power, the platform is not subordinate to the institution. It is the condition of its existence in India.

The Question the Press Releases Do Not Ask

There is a question that none of the April 2026 announcement coverage – not Times Higher, not PIE News, not The Statesman – has yet asked: what happens to students when – or, if – the platform withdraws?

University partnerships are not permanent. Commercial arrangements end – through financial stress, strategic realignment, or simply better offers elsewhere. ECA has built a “scalable blueprint” designed to be replicated across many universities. If that blueprint is replicated with a competitor of Birkbeck’s, the commercial logic of the ECA-Birkbeck partnership comes under pressure. If ECA’s India operations do not reach projected scale, the business case for maintaining the campus weakens.

When a traditional IBC closes – as some have, globally – the disruption falls primarily on the foreign university’s reputation and on the students mid-programme. When a platform-operated IBC closes, the disruption is potentially systemic: affecting multiple universities, multiple cohorts, across multiple cities simultaneously.

India’s regulators have not yet been tested by a platform failure. They should be thinking about it now, before the platform oligopoly consolidates further.

What This Means for Universities Considering India

I have argued before – and the argument has not changed – that India is a genuine and serious opportunity for foreign universities willing to engage with it on its own terms, at the pace it requires, with the institutional commitment it demands. The opening created by NEP 2020 and the UGC Regulations 2023 is real.

What is also real is that the platform intermediary has inserted itself between that opportunity and the universities seeking it. The intermediary is not always the wrong choice. Navitas has built sustainable pathway programmes. Eruditus has demonstrated that Indian students will pay for well-branded, professionally delivered learning experiences.

But the terms of engagement matter. A university that outsources its India operations to a platform – and retains only the degree-awarding function – has not really entered India. It has licensed its brand to someone who has. The distinction matters for students, for regulators, and for the long-term credibility of the IBC model in India.

The platform oligopoly has arrived. The question is whether India’s regulatory architecture – and its universities’ strategic instincts – are equal to it.

There is a detail in the Birkbeck case that has received no commentary, but deserves it. Birkbeck’s legal name is Birkbeck College, University of London – it is a constituent college of the University of London federation, not a freestanding university. It has held degree-awarding powers of its own since 2012, but has deliberately chosen not to exercise them, preferring to award University of London degrees on behalf of its students. The degree its Bengaluru students will receive will say “University of London” – an institution that has no formal presence in, and bears no direct regulatory accountability to, India’s UGC framework.

This means the Birkbeck India campus involves three distinct legal actors: Birkbeck College (LoI holder), the University of London (degree awarder), and the Education Centre of Australia (campus operator).

The UGC’s regulatory architecture assumes a single, accountable foreign institution. What has in fact arrived is a nested structure – a college sheltering under a federal university’s brand, operationalised by an Australian company – in which it is genuinely unclear where ultimate accountability resides. If a student is wrongly failed, a programme is abruptly discontinued, or the campus closes mid-cycle, which of these three entities answers to the UGC? That question has no current answer in Indian regulatory law. It should have one.

 
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Posted by on 18/04/2026 in Education, governance, pathways, reputational decay, structural analysis, students, Uncategorized, writing

 

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